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Practitioner's Perspectives
Section 301: The Privatization of
Retaliation
N. David Palmeter*
". .. to each according to his threat advantage is not a principle
of justice. "--John Rawls'
A multitude of bilateral and multilateral economic and trade
agreements tie most of the world's governments to each other in a
wide variety of ways, creating both rights and obligations. Govern-
ments may assert additional economic rights even in the absence of
formal agreements. That governments claim authority to take steps
to protect these interests is not a startling proposition. They some-
times pursue their claimed rights unilaterally; at other times they
may do so through the often imperfect procedures of such interna-
tional agreements as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
2
In the United States the exercise of this authority is complicated
by the constitutional separation of powers. The Constitution of the
United States gives the legislature complete power over foreign com-
merce, yet, as a practical matter, that power must be exercised by
the executive.3 The problem is solved by laws that delegate specified
* Chairman, Trade and Customs Law Subcommittee, Antitrust and Trade Law Com-
mittee, International Bar Association; Partner, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon,
Washington, D.C.
1. J. RAwis, A TmoRy OF JusricE 134 (1971).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 3687, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
3. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 2, provides that Congress shall have the power "[tlo
regulate Commerce with foreign nations ....." Id.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 3
foreign commerce powers from Congress to the executive. For ex-
ample, when the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was enacted, Section
252 authorized the President to enforce the international economic
rights of the United States by retaliating against foreign import
restrictions with higher tariffs or quotas.4 This was a limited, specified
delegation by Congress to the President of the otherwise exclusive
congressional power over tariffs and quotas.
There was nothing particularly unusual about this action. All
governments would claim to have the same power, whether or not
their constitutional structure requires that it be set out so explicitly.
Unfortunately, however, the story in the United States does not stop
there.
With enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, Section 252 was amended
and renumbered "Section 301," a statutory designation that seems
well on its way to becoming world-famous.5 Section 301 was amended
further in 1979,6 again in 1984, 7 and most recently in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.8 Each amendment ratcheted
the law further toward protectionism. 9 Today, Section 301 is neither
as obscure nor as non-controversial as its predecessor, Section 252.
Nor should it be, for Section 301 dangerously automatizes and
privatizes the exercise of what should be purely discretionary govern-
ment power. Section 301 implicitly attempts to impose U.S. standards
on the rest of the world and, somewhat hypocritically, establishes a
standard for the rest of the world which the United States itself
cannot meet.
Presently, there are three distinct Section 301 procedures: "Regu-
lar" 301 and two outgrowths: "Super" 301 and "Special" 301. They
present to the lawyer a bewildering display of some of the worst
statutory drafting in the common law world. Provisions refer forward
and backward with confusing, tautological abandon, sometimes can-
celling each other, sometimes not. 0 In fact, "301" is shorthand for
4. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 872, 879 (1962).
5. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1974).
6. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 301, 93 Stat. 144, 295 (1979).
7. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 301, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000 (1984).
8. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 301, 102
Stat. 1107, 1164 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Act].
9. This is detailed by Bliss, The Amendments to Section 301: An Overview and Suggested
Strategies for Foreign Response, 20 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 501 (1989) [hereinafter Bliss].
10. "Section 301 is an intricate maze of mandatory commands in one place and extremely
wide loopholes in the other. One needs a wiring diagram to trace whether mandatory commands
given in one part will actually reach their final target without passing through at least one
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nine separate sections (Sections 301-309) of the Trade Act of 1974,
as amended. "Super" 301 is yet another section, and "Special" 301
is still another." In the end, they all represent unilateral decisions
by one government as to the propriety of the policies of other
governments; these unilateral decisions are combined with threats,
and could lead to actions sufficient to ignite a trade war. Only the
narrowest of escape routes is provided.
REGULAR 301
From its 1962 beginnings, Section 301 has grown from an unob-
jectionable grant of necessary authority to the President, to something
closely resembling a right of action for aggrieved private parties. The
rationale for these evolving changes is grounded in the fact that
foreign import restrictions hamper private U.S. interests-the interests
of exporters, either actual or potential. The earlier changes in Section
301 essentially were procedural: they provided a mechanism through
which the private sector could bring its complaints to government.
With successive amendments, the procedures have become more
elaborate, the room for governmental discretion more limited. 2 To-
day's "Regular" 301 contains procedures that are almost formal,
with petitions from private interests, public hearings, strict time limits
for obligatory findings, and an all but mandatory requirement that
the United States take unilateral, retaliatory action against other
governments if appropriate findings are made.
3
loophole exit." R. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, Dec.
1, 1989 [hereinafter Hudec] (paper presented to Conference on Super 301 and World Trading
System, Program in International Economics & Journalism, Columbia University, to be
published in the Proceedings of the Conference) (copy on file at offices of The Transnational
Lawyer).
11. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 1301 (amending Sections 301-309 of the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411-2419 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)); id. at § 1302 (adding Section
310, tit. III, ch.l of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2420 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989))
[hereinafter Super 301]; id. at § 1303(b) (adding Section 182 to tit. I, ch. 8 of the Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)) [hereinafter Special 301]. Future
citations to Sections 301-310 and to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 are to these sections
as amended. Additionally, Title I, Subtitle C, Part 4 of the 1988 Act, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101 -
3111 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989), constitutes the Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, 19
U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West 1988). The Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988 provides for a
Section 301-type procedure for telecommunications equipment. Section 1382 of that Act (19
U.S.C.A. § 3111 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)) limits action to that permitted by international
agreements, including GATT. Id.
12. See Bliss, supra note 9.
13. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 302(a) (19 U.S.C.A. § 2412(a) (vest 1978 & Supp.
1989)), provides that any interested person may file a petition with the Trade Representative
requesting action under Section 301, and setting forth allegations in support of the request.
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The likelihood of mandatory action has been furthered by the 1988
formal transfer of Section 301 authority from the President to the
U.S. Trade Representative. 4 While it is true, as some argue, that the
Trade Representative is a presidential appointee and therefore subject
to presidential control, it remains true that the transfer increases the
likelihood of unilateral U.S. action.'5
First, as a government official subject to Senate confirmation, the
Trade Representative, unlike the President, is subject to congressional
questioning and to direct congressional pressure. Further, when Sec-
tion 301 authority was lodged in the President, government agencies
other than the Trade Representative also had an important, formal
role in the policy-making process. The State Department, for exam-
ple, might approach the issue of unilateral retaliatory action from a
foreign policy viewpoint, while the Defense Department considered
the security implications, and the Treasury Department focused on
the economic consequences. The transfer of Section 301 authority to
the Trade Representative has greatly reduced the role of other agen-
cies in the policy-making process. The matter now rests effectively
on the Trade Representative's "turf," and the Trade Representative
The Trade Representative is required to decide within 45 days whether to initiate an investi-
gation. If the decision of the Trade representative is negative, the petitioner must be informed
of the reasons, and a summary of the reasons for denial must be published in the Federal
Register. If the decision of the Trade Representative is affirmative, the Trade Representative
shall, inter alia, provide an opportunity for presentation of views, including, if requested, a
public hearing. Section 303 of the 1988 Act (19 U.S.C.A. § 2413 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)),
requires consultations with the concerned foreign government if the dispute involves a trade
agreement, and formal use of the agreement's dispute settlement procedures if the matter is
not resolved in 150 days. Section 304 of the 1988 Act (19 U.S.C.A. § 2414 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1989)), requires the Trade Representative to make a determination within 30 days of
the conclusion of a dispute settlement procedure, or generally within 6, 12, or 18 months in
other cases. The determination of the Trade Representative must be published in the Federal
Register together with a description of the facts upon which it is based. Id.
14. As amended by the 1988 Act, Section 301 is entitled "Actions by United States Trade
Representative" and states, at subsection (a)(1): "If the United States Trade Representative
determines .. ." 1988 Act, supra note 8; 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)
(emphasis added). Previously, there was no reference to the Trade Representative in the title,
and it stated, at subsection (a)(1): "If the President determines . . . " Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
15. As the House Committee on Ways and Means noted:
The Committee recognizes that the U.S.T.R. [United States Trade Representative]
serves as the representative of the President and in certain limited circumstances
broader U.S. national interests may be involved in Section 301 decisions affecting
foreign governments that may override strictly trade policy concerns. The Committee
expects such instances would be rare.
H.R. REp. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 59 (1987). H.R. 3 was the House bill that
eventually became the 1988 Act. See H.R. RaP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
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will have to justify its decisions to Congress on that basis*16
While the law permits the Trade Representative to refrain from
taking retaliatory action, it makes this decision extremely difficult in
practice by ordering action with one hand, and providing only a very
narrow, politically difficult escape with the other. Retaliatory action
is required if the Trade Representative determines that: (1) U.S.
rights under a trade agreement have been denied; 17 (2) an act, policy
or practice of another government denies the United States the
benefits of a trade agreement; 18 or (3) a foreign governmental act,
policy, or practice is "unjustifiable." 19 When any of these criteria
are satisfied, Section 301 provides that the Trade Representative
"shall take action." 20
But this apparent imperative for action is relaxed subsequently by
clauses in the lw authorizing the Trade Representative to decline to
take action if: (1) GATT determines that the foreign practice in
question does not violate U.S. rights; 21 (2) the Trade Representative
finds that the foreign government is taking measures to reach a
satisfactory solution; 22 (3) the foreign government agrees to compen-
16. Traditionally, trade policy formulation has been an inter-agency responsibility. At the
Cabinet level is the Trade Policy Committee; at the sub-Cabinet level is the Trade Policy
Committee Review Group; and at the staff level, the Trade Policy Staff Committee. Rules
concerning the operations and membership of these committees are set forth in 15 C.F.R. §§
2002.0 - .2 (1989). A Section 301 Committee is a subordinate body of the Trade Policy Staff
Committee. 15 C.F.R. § 2002.3 (1989). The 1988 Act contained a series of amendments that
upgraded the role of the Trade Representative in the inter-agency process. See 1988 Act, supra
note 8, at § 1601 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2171). "The basic purpose of the amendments,"
according to the House Report,
is to reemphasize the intent of Congress ... that the [United States Trade Repre-
sentative] has the primary responsibility in the Executive branch as chief adviser to
the President and to the Congress for the development, coordination, and adminis-
tration of U.S. international trade policy. The Committee emphasizes that the
delegation by Congress of its constituted power to regulate foreign commerce in
many areas is meant to be exercised by the U.S. Trade Representative on behalf of
the President, not by other Cabinet officers.
H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 166 (1987).
17. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(1); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(1) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
18. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(1); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(1) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
19. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(1); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(1) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
20. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(1); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(aX1) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
21. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(2); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(aX2) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
22. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(2); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(2) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
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sate the United States;23 (4) retaliatory action would result in an
adverse impact on the U.S. economy greater than the benefits it
would confer; 24 and (5) retaliatory action would cause serious harm
to U.S. national security.25
The law also recognizes and accepts political realities to some
degree by providing that the Trade Representative shall make its
decision "subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President. '26
Thus, as a purely legal matter, the President remains in control. As
a realistic political matter, however, Congress has sent a very clear
signal to the Executive Branch that, apart form extraordinary situa-
tions, Congress wants these decisions to be made by the Trade
Representative in the context of trade disputes alone, and not in light
of other policy considerations. 27
Since its days as Section 252 of the 1962 law, Section 301 has been
steadily and uninterruptedly amended to reduce the influence of
wider policy considerations in its use, and instead to compel action. 28
This trend is even more apparent from the two 1988 outgrowths of
"Regular" Section 301: "Super" 301 and "Special" 301.
"SUPER" 30129
The belief that many foreign governments maintain an extensive
web of protectionist devices that need to be attacked led not only to
the increasingly mandatory procedures of "Regular" 301, it led also
to "Super" 301 which is aimed at countries with a consistent pattern
of trade barriers and market-distorting practices.3" "Super" 301
23. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(2); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(2) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
24. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(2); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(2) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
25. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(2); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(2) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
26. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(1), 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a)(1) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
27. "Clearly on transferring final decision-making authority from the President to the
[United States Trade Representative], Congress was sending a signal to the [United States
Trade Representative] that it expects the amendment to produce a greater willingness to take
action under Section 301." Bliss, supra note 9.
28. See Bliss, supra note 9.
29. The term "Super 301" has adhered to Section 1302 of the 1988 Act, supra note 8,
which adds Section 301 to the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2420 (West 1978 & Supp.
1989). See Bliss, supra note 9.
30. Jagdish Bhagwati terms the belief that foreign markets are closed to United States
goods, and the belief that the playing field is not level, to a "self-serving 'I am more open
than thou' presumption against the new economically successful rivals." J. BHAOWATI, PRO-
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requires the Trade Representative to investigate the world, to name
the countries, the barriers and the practices that most offend, and
then to self-initiate a 301 investigation against those deemed "pri-
ority." No petition from a private party is needed. After the inves-
tigation is underway, the Trade Representative is required to enter
into negotiations with the offending government with a view toward
eliminating the barrier or practice. If negotiations are unsuccessful,
Section 301's mandatory retaliation provisions apply-subject, of
course, to the five narrow escape hatches provided by the law.3
In June 1989, the Trade Representative identified Brazil, India,
and Japan as three "priority" countries that, among them, main-
tained six barriers to be prosecuted under Section 301: Import li-
censing in Brazil; investment and insurance practices in India; and
forest product, satellite, and super computer restrictions in Japan.
Section 301 cases duly were initiated. If solutions satisfactory to the
United States are not reached in these disputes, serious trade con-
sequences could follow beginning as early as mid-1990. 32
The saga does not end with the six disputes. The Trade Represen-
tative is required every year to file annually with Congress a "Na-
tional Trade Estimate" which details remaining foreign barriers and
distortions to trade. 3  If these priority barriers are identified and are
not eliminated in accordance with the criteria of Section 301, the
Trade Representative must retaliate or tell Congress why it has not
done so. 34 In the context of the U.S. political system, it is possible
TECTIONIsm 68 (1988). Some would consider the comment of Senator John Heinz (R-Pa.) to
be an example of this "I am more open than thou" presumption: "the mercantilist practices
of other nations that deny their trading partners equal access to their markets while they
exploit access to our market to the fullest." S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1987).
For more on the political background of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1987, see Bliss, supra
note 9.
31. This is an example of the less than clear drafting of Section 301 of the 1988 Act,
supra note 8, and its assorted offshoots. Section 301(b) (19 U.S.C.A. § 2420 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1989)), requires initiation of an investigation under Section 302(b)(1) (19 U.S.C.A. §
2412 (b)(1) (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)), which, in turn requires that the investigation be under
the provisions of Section 301. Subsection (a)(2) of Section 301 of the 1988 Act provides that
action need not be taken in certain specified circumstances. See supra notes 21-25 and
accompanying text. Thus, the route seems to be Section 310, to Section 302, to Section 301.
As Robert Hudec says, "One needs a wiring diagram ... ." Hudec, supra note 10.
32. See USTR Fact Sheets on Super 301 Trade Liberalization Priorities and Special 301
on Intellectual Property, Released May 25, 1989, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 715 (May 31,
1989) [hereinafter USTR Fact Sheets].
33. See 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 310(a); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2420(a) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989) (referring to the report required by Section 181(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, reprinted
as amended in 19 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)).
34. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 310(b); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2420(b) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989).
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that more pressure to retaliate could be imposed on the Trade
Representative, but certainly not much more.
"SPECIAL" 30131
Congressional concern with international protection of intellectual
property rights is reflected in a provision of the 1988 Trade Act that
has been dubbed "Special" 301.36 This requires the Trade Represen-
tative, "Super" 301-style, to investigate the world and to identify
countries that deny adequate and effective protection to intellectual
property rights, as well as those that deny fair and equitable market
access to U.S. firms that rely on intellectual property protection.
From this overall list, the Trade Representative is instructed to
identify "priority" countries. The identification of priority countries
has the effect of compelling the Trade Representative to self-initiate
Section 301 cases against them unless the Trade Representative de-
termines that an investigation would be "detrimental to United States
economic interests."
'37
However, the Trade Representative did not identify any countries
as priority under the "Special" 301 provision. 3 Instead, it finessed
the issue by stating that due to continuing negotiations on intellectual
property issues, the best course is to pursue those issues through the
Uruguay Round. In the view of the Trade Representative, a Special
35. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 1303 (adding Section 182 to the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)).
36. The provision is intended, in the words of the House Report, "to address the growing
problem of piracy and counterfeiting faced in foreign markets by United States firms and
industries." H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., at 163 (1987). Similarly, the Senate
Finance Committee said that the provision "establishes a comprehensive program, within the
overall framework of Section 301, to address the growing problem of inadequate and ineffective
intellectual property protection, and to address the unique foreign market access problems of
U.S. companies that rely upon intellectual property protection." S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 75 (1987).
37. This is another example of the less than clear drafting of Section 301 and its assorted
offshoots. Special 301, supra note 11, may be read from beginning to end without an inkling
that an investigation is required. Special 301 provides for the identification of countries that
deny adequate protection, or market access, for intellectual property rights; it provides special
rules for identification of countries; it provides further for revocations and additional identi-
fications; and it sets forth definitions. Period. Not a word is mentioned on compulsory
investigations or required action. Id. It is only in "regular" Section 301 that it becomes
apparent that something is afoot. Section 302 of the 1988 Act, supra note 8, (19 U.S.C.A. §
2412 (West 1978 & Supp. 1989)) provides in subsection (b)(2)(A) that no later than 30 days
after a country is identified under Special 301, the Trade Representative shall initiate a Section
301 investigation. Id. Thus, the route here seems to be Section 302, to Section 182, to Section
301. Again, one indeed does need a "wiring diagram ....." Hudec, supra note 10. See also
supra note 31 and accompanying text for further discussion.
38. See USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 32, at 718-19.
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301 action would be counterproductive to that policy.3 9 Accordingly,
in May, 1989, the Trade Representative created-with some ominous
mutterings from industry4-two additional categories: a priority watch
list consisting of Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia,
Taiwan, and Thailand; and a simple "watch" list of 17 additional
countries. 41 We have decided that we are right, the United States in
effect said, and that most of the rest of the world is wrong.
Yet, the proponents of Section 301 maintain that the law really
does not offend the world trading system; rather, they say, the law
seeks only to open markets, to further world trade for the benefit
of all. And, they argue, Section 301 requires nothing more than the
exercise of a power any government claims; it is simply the mechanism
the U.S. government employs domestically to exercise this power.
What, they ask, is wrong with that?42
There is quite a bit wrong with that, beginning with the means by
which governmental power is exercised. It is one thing for govern-
ments to claim the unilateral power to protect their economic rights
internationally; it is quite another thing to hand that power over, as
Section 301 effectively does, to the initiative of private parties. It is
one thing for governments to exercise that power narrowly, discretely,
after due deliberation, and with proper appreciation of the possible
consequences; 43 it is quite another thing to provide, as "Super" 301
does, for nearly automatic action without regard to the consequences.
39. See USTR Official Says Bringing Cases under "Special 301" Would Harm Uruguay
Round, IN sDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 10, 1989, at 13.
40. Industrial groups publicly supported the action with, for example, the warning of the
National Music Publishers' Association that prompt designation of the countries is expected
if "results are not forthcoming." 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 686 (May 31, 1989). The United
States Trade Representative's enforcement of Section 301 is likely to continue to be characterized
by finessing moves and by delays that ignore some of its deadlines so long as the concerned
industry, and its congressional backers, are appeased. As Robert Hudec observed, "If past
conduct is any guide, Congress will be prepared to overlook delays as long as, in the end, a
sufficient number of heads roll into the basket." Hudec, supra note 10, at 9.
41. These countries were: Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia. In November 1989, Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan were downgraded from the
"priority watch list" to the "watch list." See USTR Fact Sheets, supra note 32.
42. See, e.g., G. Feketekuty, U.S. Policy on 301 and Super 301, Dec. 1, 1989 (paper
presented to the Conference on Super 301 and the World Trading System, Program in
International Economics and Journalism, Columbia University, to be published in the pro-
ceedings of the Conference) (copy on file at offices of The Transnational Lawyer). Mr.
Feketekuty, Counselor to the United States Trade Representative, remarked, inter alia, "Section
301 of U.S. trade legislation is designed, in part, to provide a procedure under which U.S.
private actors can initiate actions with respect to U.S. rights under international trade
agreements, including the GATT." Id. at 2.
43. See R. Hudec, supra note 10, at 15-16, who argues persuasively that a good case can,
and perhaps must, be made for selective disobedience of GATT. Id.
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To argue, as its supporters do, that Section 301 merely is an internal
legal mechanism, and that others have no right to complain until
action actually is taken-until 301 "crosses a border"-is akin to
arguing that when a country makes bellicose threats to its neighbors,
issues ultimatums, mobilizes its troops and fires up its tanks, the
neighbors have no cause to complain since their borders have not
yet been crossed.
Another thing wrong with Section 301 is its implicit notion that
the U.S. way is the "fair" way, and that it is up to the rest of the
world to follow suit. This is an arrogant assumption, particularly
when U.S. performance may be viewed as falling short of what it
should be-even in areas of greatest concern to 301's supporters.
For example, the European Community complains that the United
States does not provide adequate protection for geographic designa-
tions of origin, particularly for wines such as Burgundy, Champagne,
Chablis, and for cheeses such as Cheddar and Gouda.44 Would
proponents of 301 support retaliation against U.S. exports by gov-
ernments who contend that U.S. permits pirating of their appellations
of origin? Or what of the U.S. use of jury trials in patent cases?
Many foreign patent owners fear that their intellectual property rights
may be destroyed by uninformed, or worse, prejudiced, lay jurors.41
Would the right to trial by jury, as guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and as implemented in the U.S., violate a Section 301
enacted verbatim by another government?46
Still another thing wrong with Section 301 is the fact that the
United States itself does not live up to its own standard. For example,
Section 301 calls for retaliation against countries which do not
implement, within months, GATT panel reports favorable to the
United States.47 Yet the United States, on at least four separate
occasions, has failed to implement adverse GATT panel reports within
44. EUR. Com., REP. ON U.S. TRADE BARRIERS 29 (May 3, 1989).
45. As related by international patent attorney, James D. Halsey, Jr., partner, Staas arid
Halsey, Washington, D.C. No formal complaints appear to have been made on this question,
presumably because it involves a provision of the United States Constitution and as such,
foreign governments consider change unlikely if not impossible.
46. U.S. CONST. amend VII.
47. 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 304(a)(2)(A); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(a)(2)(A) (West 1978 &
Supp. 1989), requires a determination 30 days after the dispute settlement procedure is
concluded, or 18 months after the United States investigation was started-whichever is earlier.
Id. Section 305(a) of the 1988 Act, supra note 8 (19 U.S.C.A. § 2415(a) (West 1978 & Supp.
1989)), in turn calls for retaliatory action within 30 days of the determination, subject to a
maximum delay of an additional 180 days if substantial progress is being made in negotiating
a solution to the dispute. Id.
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the deadlines Section 301 would impose on other countries. These
failures include: a June 1987 "Superfund" report which was not
implemented until late 1989;41 a customs-users fee report of early
1988 that as yet has not been implemented; 49 a November 1988 report
on Section 337 of the Tariff Act that is languishing; 0 and a sugar
quota report of June 1989 that is unlikely to be implemented anytime
soon.
51
The Section 337 report is notable for two reasons. First, the United
States blocked GATT acceptance of the report from November 1988
to November 1989, causing a delay that itself violated Section 301's
deadlines.Y2 More importantly, the report found that Section 337
denied GATT rights to foreign owners of intellectual property in the
United States. Now, given the great concern expressed by supporters
of Section 301 for intellectual property rights, it seems odd-if not
hypocritical-that they take so long to amend a U.S. statute deter-
mined to deny those rights.
53
In addition to unjustifiable or discriminatory foreign practices,
Section 301 also applies to practices that are found to be "unrea-
sonable," no matter how justifiable they otherwise may be.54 By this
48. United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Report of the
Panel adopted on 17 June 1987, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BAsic INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DocuMENTs 136 (34th Supp. 1988). More than two years later, the United States
took action to correct the violation. Steel Trade Liberalization Program Implementation Act,
§ 8, Pub. L. No. 101-221, 103 Stat. 1339, 1348 (1989).
49. United States-Customs User Fee, Report of the Panel adopted on 2 February 1988,
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 245
(35th Supp. 1989). Congress adjourned in November 1989, without enacting legislation to
correct the GATT violation. Draft legislation proposed by the Treasury Department was
described as "more a starting point for debate than a completed proposal." See Treasury
Unveils Draft Legislation to Make Customs User Fee GA7T-Legal, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
352 (Mar. 22, 1989).
50. See GA7T Council Adopts Dispute Panel Reports on U.S. Section 337, Korean Beef
Quotas, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1466 (Nov. 15, 1989).
51. See GATT Panel Rules U.S. Sugar Quotas Illegal, Urges U.S. to Revamp System, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 767 (June 14, 1989). The United States reportedly hopes to delay
implementation until after the scheduled completion later this year of the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations. See U.S. Hopes to Have until End of Uruguay Round to Revise Sugar
Quotas Found to Violate GAT, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 945 (July 19, 1989).
52. See GATT Council Adopts Dispute Panel Reports on U.S. Section 337, Korean Beef
Quotas, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1466 (Nov. 15, 1989); 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 305(a);
19 U.S.C.A. § 2415(a) (Vest 1978 & Supp. 1989).
53. See Heinz Sees Difficulty in Changihg U.S. Law Found to be Incompatible with
GATT Rules, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1467 (Nov. 15, 1989), which stated: "Congress is
likely to have trouble with the prospect of making substantive changes in Section 337 of the
1930 Tariff Act because of its role as the centerpiece of U.S. intellectual property law, Sen.
John Heinz (R-Pa) told a business group Nov. 8." Id.
54. "An act, policy, or practice is unreasonable if the act, policy, or practice, while not
necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United
States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable." 1988 Act, supra note 8, at § 301(d)(3)(A); 19.
U.S.C.A. § 2411(d)(3)(A) (West 1978 & Supp. 1989).
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standard, too, important U.S. practices do not meet the criteria of
Section 301. For example, the United States frequently denounces
agricultural trade barriers imposed by other governments, asserting
correctly that most of these schemes violate GATT.55 At the same
time, however, the charge cannot be turned back on U.S. agricultural
barriers because, in 1955, the U.S. demanded and received a waiver
of its GATT obligations for agricultural products.5 6 This waiver is
used to justify strict quotas on dairy products, wheat, peanuts,
cotton, and sugar.57 Thus, to this day, these U.S. import restrictions
are permitted by GATT, while their counterparts in other countries
are not. This is far from a reasonable situation, justifiable or not,
and because it is not reasonable it too violates the standards of
Section 301.
It is not necessary to contend that the world trading system is in
ideal condition in order to question the wisdom of Section 301.11
Certainly major improvements need to be made. These include not
only better rules for governing trade in goods, but also rules for
trade in services, and, in the view of many, stricter standards for
the protection of intellectual property rights. Certainly, also, the
GATT dispute settlement mechanism needs improvement. 9 Support-
ers of Section 301 point to all of these problems as justification for
the statute.
But it is not necessary for the United States to privatize and
automatize its retaliatory powers in order to improve the international
trading system. Nor is it necessary for the United States to label
55. See, e.g., U.S., EC Agree to let GATT Panels Resolve Disputes Concerning Soybeans,
Sugar Quotas, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 649 (May 24, 1989) (concerning U.S. charges that
EC soybean subsidies cut U.S. exports); Canada Wins Time to Consider Panel Finding Against
Ice Cream, Yogurt Import Policies, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1347 (Oct. 18, 1989).
56. Waiver Granted to the United States in Connection with Import Restrictions Imposed
under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act (of 1933), as amended,
Decision of the Contracting Parties of GAYT of Mar. 5, 1955, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, BASIC INsTRUJMENTs AND SELCTED DOCUMENTS 32 (3d Supp. 1955). "The breadth
of this waiver, coupled with the fact that the waiver was granted to the contracting party that
was at one and the same time the world's largest trading nation and the most vocal proponent
of freer international trade, constituted a grave blow to GATT's prestige." K. DAM, THE
GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORoANIzATIoN 260 (1970).
57. USTIC, HARMONZED TASUFI SCHEDULE OF TnE UN ED STATES, ch. 99, subch. IV.
58. See Hudec, supra note 10, who most effectively questions the wisdom of Section 301
of the 1988 Act while contending that limited, principled disobedience to GAIT may be
helpful. Id.
59. For discussion of GATT dispute settlement, see Bliss, GA7T Dispute Settlement
Reform in the Uruguay Round: Problems and Prospects, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31 (1987);
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FO.DHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987); Waincymer, GATT
Dispute Settlement: An Agenda for Evaluation and Reform, 14 N.C.J. INT'L L. & ComM.
REo. 81 (1989).
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other countries as unfair traders in order to do so. Rather, the United
States could contribute best to the improvement of the international
trading system by using it: By routing its grievances through the
system, and by accepting and acting on the legitimate complaints of
others as quickly as it would have others accept and act on its own.

